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BANKING PRACTICES AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
William T. Lifland*
Mention of the application of the antitrust laws to banking immediately
calls to mind the series of antitrust proceedings against bank mergers resulting
in the passage of the Bank Merger Act of 1966.1 Although much has been writ-
ten on the issues involved in those proceedings, there has-been little discussion
of the application of the antitrust laws to everyday banking operations. This
raises equally important issues, and it is the purpose of this article to survey
them briefly. Because of the limited scope of this survey, no attempt is made
to consider all the possible technical defenses and qualifications applicable in
particular situations or to consider the additional issues that may be generated
--by the application of state laws.
I. General Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to Banking Practices
A. Federal Statutes
1. The Sherman Act
There seems to be very little doubt that the Sherman Act applies to com-
mercial banking practices. For some years there was reason to believe that
banking was not "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman
Act.2 Since 1944, however, when the fire insurance business was held to be
"trade or commerce,"' there has been a strong likelihood that banking would
also be held to be "trade or commerce." In 1963 the Supreme Court noted in
the Philadelphia Nat'l Bank4 case that an argument that banking was not "trade
or commerce" "would have no merit. 5 By 1966 the Bank Merger Act
amendments made it apparent that Congress believed that antitrust con-
siderations should play a part in banking regulation. It is improbable, therefore,
that the Sherman Act will be held inapplicable to commercial banking, or that
Congress will enact any sweeping exemption of commercial banking from the
scope of the antitrust laws. Although the Sherman Act may be a favorite target
for some magazine and editorial writers, it has substantial support in Congress.
A great number of people sincerely believe that without the antitrust laws as a
brake on excessive cooperation or overaggressive conduct in business, free enter-
prise, as we know it, could not survive.
* Member, New York Bar, District of Columbia Bar, New Jersey Bar; B.S., Yale Uni-
versity, 1949; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1952; Partner, Cahill, Gordon, Sonnett, Reindel
& Ohl, New York City.
1 80 Stat. 236 (1966), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1829(c) (Supp. 1966).
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 "(1964). Professor Gerald C. Fischer of Indiana
University has compiled an excellent account of the background of the application of the
Sherman Act to commercial banking. It is scheduled to appear as chapter seven of his book,
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF COMMERCIAL BANKING. See Berle, Banking Under the Anti-
Trust Laws, 49 COLum. L. Rzv. 589 (1949).
3 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 (1944).
4 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
5 Id. at 336 n.12.
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2. The Clayton Act
Federal antitrust law is by no means limited to the Sherman Act, and other
statutory provisions, perhaps the best known of which are sections 2 and 3 of
the Clayton Act,6 must be considered. Section 2 of the Clayton Act is generally
referred to as the Robinson-Patman Act; it relates to unlawful discrimina-
tion and brokerage. Section 3 relates primarily to exclusive dealing and
tying agreements. These provisions apply only -to transactions involving
"commodities," and there is a good argument that banking services are not
"commodities." 7 That particular question, however, has not been decided by
the Supreme Court, and it should be noted that some of the same practices cov-
ered by the Clayton Act have been held to be within the broader coverage of
the Sherman Act.' The difference between Sherman Act coverage and Robin-
son-Patman or Clayton Act coverage rests primarily in the higher degree of
proof as to effect on competition required under the Sherman Act. Although
it may be very important in litigated cases, this difference is often disregarded
in planning a bank's day-to-day activities because the exact effect of a particular
practice on competition is usually not ascertainable. Therefore, it is best to
assume, for planning purposes, that discrimination, exclusive dealing, and tying
agreements may raise antitrust problems for commercial banks.
B. Possibility of Antitrust Immunity Resulting From Regulatory Statutes
It is frequently said that since banking is a thoroughly regulated industry,
there is no justification for the application of the antitrust laws to banking.9
However, the mere existence of a regulatory system has generally not been held
to exclude the application of the antitrust laws.'" For example, the gas-pipeline
industry, the communications industry, and the transportation industry have
all, to some extent, had antitrust problems along with their regulatory problems.
In general, except where conferred in considerable specificity, it is not safe to
count upon immunity."
1. State Regulation
The relationship between the federal and state governments presents some
6 38 Stat. 730 '(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-14 (1964).
7 See Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 369 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1966);
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 812 (1962); United States v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc.,
102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951). See also Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 319
F.2d 683, 689 (2d Cir. 1963); Gaylord Shops, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Miracle Mile, 219 F. Supp.
400 (W.D. Pa. 1963); PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 33
(1963); RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 59-61 (1962).
8 For examples of application of the Sherman Act to such practices in other industries,
see United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 '(1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). See United States v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665, 673 (1964) (dissenting opinion), with respect to
overlapping of the Sherman Act by § 7 of the Clayton Act.
9 E.g., Abramson, The Philadelphia National Bank Case: A Reply, in STUDIES IN BANK-
ING COMPETITION AND THE BANKING STRUCTURE 39 (U.S. Treasury - The Adm'r of Nat'l
Banks ed. 1966).
10 E.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 '(1963); California v.
FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962); Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
11 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 343 U.S. 414 (1952); Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
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difficult legal problems. Some are constitutional in nature, for example, where
Congress' regulatory power is derived solely from the commerce clause and
interstate commerce may not be directly involved. The problems may also be
statutory, for example, where the question is whether Congress intended to
override or restrain state action where it had power to do so. In Parker v.
Brown,'2 the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act was not to be con-
strued as invalidating a state-imposed agricultural marketing program. At the
same time, it was made clear that the state could not authorize a conspiracy
among individuals and excuse it from the Sherman Act. In this extremely
difficult area, it is impossible to generalize confidently to what degree, if any,
bank conduct may be exempted from the operation of the federal antitrust laws
by state action. To a large extent, any determination will depend on the par-
ticular subject of state regulation, the nature of the conduct authorized or re-
quired, and the type and extent of participation in such conduct by state
authorities.
In considering exemptions from the antitrust laws, it is useful to examine
the experience of the insurance industry regarding the effect of state regulation.
After the Supreme Court held that fire insurance was "commerce" within the
meaning of the Sherman Act, Congress enacted a moratorium statute, the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act." This act provided a period of time, which was set to embrace
two rounds of state legislative sessions, during which the federal antitrust laws
would be inapplicable to insurance except in certain aggravated cases and
would thereafter be applicable to the extent that insurance was not regulated
by state law.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act confirmed the power of the states to regulate
insurance and seemed an invitation to greater regulation. Many states accepted
the invitation.'4 As a result, the insurance industry may have expected that the
federal antitrust laws would not be applied to the industry to any significant
extent. Those who had such expectations were disappointed. After the expira-
tion of the moratorium, there were a number of applications of the
antitrust laws to the insurance industry because the state legislatures had not
acted in all areas, they could not effectively act in all areas, or the conduct
attacked was of the aggravated character reserved for application of the federal
laws.'" Thus, although Congress expressly deferred to the states, the antitrust
laws continued to be applied much as before. It is therefore difficult to forecast
that banks will acquire any sweeping immunity from the federal antitrust laws
merely because some banks are regulated by the states. Any immunity acquired
is likely to be of a limited nature. Deciding whether it attaches in particular
cases will raise questions such as the extent to which state action is authorized
12 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
13, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964).
14 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. §§ 22:1-1734 (1959); NEn. REv. STAT. §§ 44-1501
to -1520 (1960).
15 E.g., FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n 362 U.S. 293 (1960); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v.
Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Chicago Title
& Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1965); United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exch.,
148 F. Supp. 915 (D. La.), aff'd per curiam, .355 U.S. "22 (1957).
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without conflict with federal legislation and the degree to which states can and
do regulate practices covered by federal antitrust laws.
2. Federal Regulation
When considering the possibility of immunity from the antitrust laws
through federal laws or regulations affecting banking, the issue can be broadly
stated to be what type of accommodation and adjustment is needed to avoid
conflict between the authorities enforcing the antitrust laws and those admin-
istering the regulatory statutes.16 The Supreme Court has frequently indicated,
and it repeated in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 7 that immunity
from the antitrust laws is not easily implied. It follows that under the present
trend of decisions, if adjustments are required to harmonize the antitrust and
bank-regulatory policies, many of them will be made in the regulatory policies.
There will probably be collaboration among the various federal authorities
in order to avoid subjecting banks to conflicting rulings, but such collaboration
cannot be taken for granted. It is possible for the authorities to disagree and
present their disagreement to a court, as has frequently happened in the bank
merger cases.'" Even an agreement among the federal authorities that as to
particular subjects the antitrust laws should yield to the regulatory laws may not
fully protect the banks. Private parties may still institute treble-damage suits,
attacking under the antitrust laws conduct sanctioned by the regulatory authori-
ties.19 Without an explicit statutory grant of immunity, there is always some
possibility that a bank, although acting in good faith, may be held to have
violated the antitrust laws.
3. Overall Effect of Regulation
In summary, bank regulation may not result in exemption from the anti-
trust laws. Indeed, it may have precisely the opposite effect. With regulatory
authorities periodically looking into the records of banks, if any antitrust problems
are present, they will probably be readily detected and acted upon. Ever since
United States v. Hunterdon County Trust Co.,2" national bank examiners have
been instructed to look for evidence of joint action by banks in setting service
charges. Hunterdon County Trust concerned a number of banks that were
accused of unlawfully fixing service charges. The case was instituted as a result
of the disclosure by one of the banks, in seeking the permission of the Comp-
troller of the Currency to merge, of a joint schedule of service charges which
had been agreed upon with one of the other banks. Such agreements are dis-
cussed in the next section.
16 See, e.g., Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 '(1963);
California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
17 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963).
18 E.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 17; United States v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Go., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
19 In Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., TPADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) 11 71967 (7th
Cir. 1967), the plaintiff argued unsuccessfully that the New York Stock Exchange could not
lawfully fix commission rates on security transactions, although the SEC has the power to
review such rates.
20 1962 Trade Cas. V 70263 (D.N.J. 1962).
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II. Interbank Agreements
A. Agreements Enjoined
Turning to the subject of bank agreements that may raise antitrust ques-
tions, set out below is a list of the principal agreements enjoined in consent
decrees in the Hunterdon County Trust case and in three subsequent cases
brought in the federal district court in Minnesota.
These were agreements:
1. to set service charges (including charges asserted against checking
accounts for failure to maintain minimum balances, charges for de-
posits to such accounts, charges for checks issued, charges for collec-
tions made for a customer, certification and stop-payment charges,
charges for blank and imprinted checks, and "late charges!' to cus-
tomers of any kind) ;21
2. to publish schedules giving service charges; 22
3. to restrict competition for the account of any depositor with respect
to charges asserted against checking accounts; 23
4. to fix or stabilize service charges; 24
5. to exchange cost or other data relating to service charges;25
6. to restrict competition in interest rates paid on deposits, installment
loans on automobiles, charges against checking accounts; 26
7. to restrict advertising of, or to fix, interest rates, terms of automobile
installment loans or mortgages, or charges against checking accounts; 27
8. to restrict solicitation of business relations with any correspondent
banks; 28
9. to furnish or not to furnish bank supplies or other gifts to third per-
sons;
29
10. to restrict absorption for third persons of exchange charges for any
third person;
so
11. to restrict absorption for third persons of losses on securities;31
12. to fix the terms of loans by any bank, including particularly loans to
personnel of correspondent banks;32
13. to fix the terms of livestock loans or the rebates or commissions paid
to banks originating or servicing such loans.33
21 United States v. Duluth Clearing House Ass'n, 1964 Trade Cas. 71022, at 79053
(D. Minn. 1964); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 1964 Trade Cas. 71021, at 79051
(D. Minn. 1964);'United States v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 1964 Trade Cas. 71020, at
79049 (D. Minn. 1964); United States v. Hunterdon County Trust Co., 1962 Trade Cas.
1 70263, at 76021 (D.N.J. 1962).
22 United States v. Hunterdon County Trust Co., supra note 21, at 76021.
23 Ibid.
24 Cases cited note 21 supra.
25 United States v. Duluth Clearing House Ass'n, 1964 Trade Cas. If 71022, at 79054
(D. Minn. 1964); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 1964 Trade Cas. 11 71021, at 79051
(D. Minn. 1964); United States v. Hunterdon County Trust Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 70263,
at 76021 (D.N.J. 1962).
26 United States v. Duluth Clearing House Ass'n, supra note 25, at 79053-54.
27 Ibid.
28 Id. at 79054; United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 1964 Trade Cas. 1 71021, at 79051(D. Minn. 1964); United States v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 1964 Trade Cas. 71020, at
79049 (D. Minn. 1964).
29 United States v. Northwestern Nat1 Bank, supra note 28, at 79049.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. See also United States v. Mortgage Conference, 1948-49 Trade Cas. 62273
(S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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It should be emphasized that the decrees in these cases were entered upon con-
sent. As consent decrees, they do not necessarily indicate either that the banks
engaged in the practices enjoined or that the practices were illegal. There are
many reasons for accepting a consent decree; one reason may be simply to avoid
the expense, time, and publicity of litigation. Another reason may be that the
party accepting the decree is already in compliance and believes that no sub-
stantial disadvantage will result from continuing to comply. However, consent
decrees are usually read rather carefully by practitioners in the field, because
the Department of Justice does not normally request injunctions against prac-
tices unless it believes the practices are illegal of themselves or that it is necessary
to enjoin them in order to prevent evasion of the law.
Service charges to depositors are referred to several times in the foregoing
list. Such charges may be examined in a number of ways. It can be argued
that they are merely a means of limiting a bank's cost for what it sells. Alter-
natively, since banks are essentially in the business of providing various banking
services to different classes of customers, including depositors, it can be argued
that such service charges are the counterparts of prices charged by industrial
companies. From the antitrust point of view, it does not make much difference
whether service charges are considered to relate to input or output. If service
charges were analogized to the price an industrial company might receive for
its products, an agreement fixing service charges would be regarded as an
ordinary price-fixing agreement. If service charges were regarded instead as
a cost-limiting device, an agreement setting service charges would be analogous
to an agreement among industrial companies as to the maximum price they
would pay for supplies. In either case the Department of Justice would con-
sider that the agreement falls within the proscriptions of the Sherman Act.
The Department views agreements "setting" service charges, "stabilizing" these
charges, "restricting competition" with respect to such charges, and "restricting
advertising" of such charges as illegal agreements in unreasonable restraint
of trade.
It is apparent from the above list of agreements that were enjoined that
service charges are not the only area of cooperation the Department considers
to be beyond the scope of lawful agreement between competing banks. The
agreements enjoined in those consent decrees relate to many more areas, in-
cluding conditions for selecting and dealing with customers. They do not, of
course, include all possible types of unlawful horizontal agreements, since any
restraint of competition by agreement among competitors raises an antitrust
issue.
B. Agreements Without Restraints on Competition
Although the breadth of the prohibitions against agreements between com-
petitors means that all agreements between competing banks must be examined
with care, it does not mean that banks are precluded entirely from. agreeing
with each other. There are numerous areas in which banks can reach agree-
ment without restraining competition. For example, banks may agree to run
jointly financed advertisements urging the public to save regularly, and banks
[April, 1967]
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may agree to exchange credit information. Such agreements do not restrain
competition.
But even with these seemingly innocent agreements, qualifications are neces-
sary to implement the agreement lawfully. For example, if a joint advertise-
ment were to mention the amount of the interest paid by the advertising banks,
it might be regarded by the Department of Justice as tending to stabilize interest
rates. Similarly, in exchanging credit information, it is easy to imagine junior
credit officers advising each other against extending credit to a particular loan
applicant. The Department might conclude that an agreement had been reached
to refuse credit to a particular applicant. Recently the Department obtained
an indictment against fuel oil dealers who allegedly refused to sell fuel oil to
any customer delinquent in his account with any of them. 4 Therefore, an
agreement to refuse credit would presumably be considered illegal by the De-
partment.
The point of this qualification is that the bank lawyer's job does not stop
with approving an agreement apparently lawful on its face; he must be. sure
it is lawful in practice, since that is the standard by which the agreement will
be tested in litigation.
C. Agreements Imposing Reasonable Restraints on Competition
The contrast between agreements setting service charges, which are con-
sidered unreasonably restrictive, and agreements to exchange credit informa-
tion, where there is no restrictive agreement at all, is the black and white of the
antitrust laws as applied to banking operations. There is a considerable gray
area, consisting of possibly reasonable restraints on trade.
The restraints necessary for the proper operation of a clearing house s or
for the formation of a syndicate to make large loans36 are examples of reasonable
restraints that may well be upheld if litigated. There undoubtedly are others
as well." Nevertheless, one must be prepared to be asked whether a particular
restraint is necessary. The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Anti-
trust Division recently stated:
Let me now ask my favorite question in the context of joint ventures,
an area of the law in which rules have hardly been decisively defined. The
question, "Is this more restrictive than necessary," applies to the joint
venture itself, particularly where participants are actual or potential com-
petitors. If there are no apparent extraordinary risks, if each venturer
has or could readily get all of the resources necessary for the new opera-
tion, surely it is not unreasonable to suspect anticompetitive motivations
and consequences. And even if we concluded that the joint venture itself
is beyond reproach, it is certainly appropriate to make sure that any agree-
ments entered into by the parents in connection therewith are no more
restrictive than necessary to the launching and operation of the venture.3
34 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Jan. 26, 1967.
35 Cf. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
36 Cf. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 684-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
37 E.g., banks may also be justified in collectively seeking restraining legislative or
administrative action from the Government. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
38 Turner, Some Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 CCH Antitrust Law Symposium 7.
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It is wise not to make the assumption that merely because a restraint seems to
be in the public interest generally, it will be considered "necessary" and thus
reasonable. The restraint should also serve the public interest in competition,
that is, it should serve to create or preserve competition.
III. Single-Bank Practices
There are certain areas in which practices of a single bank may be objec-
tionable under the antitrust laws, even in the absence of any agreement with
another bank. Generally speaking, these practices can be characterized as overly
aggressive or tending toward monopoly. It is easy for a banker to believe he
is outside this category. Probably no bankers consider themselves monopolists;
they are all acutely aware of their competitors. Some of the competition the
businessman encounters, however, may not be considered sufficiently close to
save him from accusations of monopolizing within the meaning of the anti-
trust laws. In banking cases, only competition in limited areas or among cer-
tain types of lenders may be considered. 9 Moreover, even if a banker is not
accused of monopolizing, he may be accused of attempting to monopolize. The
Sherman Act proscribes attempts to monopolize as well as actual monopoliza-
tion.40 It also applies to certain overly aggressive practices, such as "tying"
agreements, where not even an attempt to monopolize is alleged.41 Hence, very
few banks can afford to ignore the laws relating to overly aggressive practices,
which laws have special relevance to banks anticipating growth. Once a company
has achieved a commanding position in its field, an important question in de-
ciding whether it is a monopolist for antitrust purposes is how it got there. Did
the others fall by the wayside, or were they tripped as they were going by?
A. Prepayment Penalties and Compensatory Balances
Of the many practices that can be examined from this point of view, provi-
sions in loan agreements for prepayment penalties and compensatory balances are
everyday examples. It would be rare indeed for such provisions to be drafted to
exclude competition rather than to serve a proper banking purpose. In particular
cases, however, this allegation might be made. Consequently, some banking law-
yers have advised their clients that prepayment penalties should bear a reasonable
relation to the lost profits or additional expenses caused the lender by refinancing.
Particular danger arises when the prepayment penalty is imposed only where the
loan is refinanced and not where the borrower acquires the funds by other means,
such as inheritance. If the penalty appears excessive, an adversary may seek
to draw the inference that the intent in imposing the penalty was not really to
compensate the bank for its expenses and lost earnings, but to exclude compe-
39 United States v. First Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United States
v. Philadelphia Nael Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
40 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
41 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953). See
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v, United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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tition by other banks. Such an exclusionary intent, if found, could be used to
support a charge of unlawful monopolization or attempt to monopolize.
In the case of compensatory balances, there are additional risks as well.
Although compensatory balances have been traditionally considered by bankers
as additional remuneration - and in some cases the sole remuneration - for
the services they perform, provisions in loan agreements requiring such balances
bear an uncomfortable resemblance to practices under attack in other industries.
One of the Department of Justice's current interests is so-called "business
reciprocity," where one party says to the other, "I will buy from you only if
you will buy from me."' The courts have invalidated a number of agreements
involving "tying" arrangements where one party says to the other, "I will sell
Product X to you only if you will buy Product Y from me."4 Such arrange-
ments have been stated to serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition and have been held illegal where the seller has "sufficient economic
power to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied
product.""
The practice of requiring compensatory balances in loan agreements
may be analogized to unlawful reciprocity or tying. Whether the analogy is apt,
however, is yet unanswered. The practice may, well be defended as a proper mea-
sure for obtaining security or increasing the banker's compensation, and the chances
of successful defense are enhanced if the provision is drawn so as not to exceed
reasonable requirements for these purposes. Furthermore, the courts might
accept an argument distinguishing tying arrangements on the ground that only
a single "product," money, is involved.45 One thing, however, is clear. No
matter how resourcefully the lawyers defend such a case, their efforts will be
thwarted if the evidence shows that a significant purpose of requiring a com-
pensatory balance was to restrict competition.
B. Other Preemption of Banking Opportunities
More generally, any practices that have the effect of preempting banking
opportunities may be challenged as exceeding the limits of fair competition and
reflecting an" intent to monopolize. Obviously, in this situation much depends
upon whether a small bank is attempting to win a place in the sun beside its
larger rivals, or the larger rivals are trying to keep that place to themselves.
Particularly in the case of a larger bank, it is desirable to avoid situations sug-
gesting that the bank's intent is to preempt banking opportunities.
Prolonged below-cost selling, particularly when supported by profitable
operations in other areas, suggests the possibility of such an intent to preempt.
In other industries, such conduct has been viewed as evidence of intent to
monopolize.46 Therefore, whenever a banker provides a service unprofitably,
42 See, e.g., United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 552 (W.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
43 See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 '(1953); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1943).
44 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 43, at 11.
45 See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953).
46 See United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 34 (1963).
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he would be well-advised to have a record of the reasons for his conduct. Perhaps
he is the victim of circumstances, which may be an adequate explanation. The
important point is that he must be prepared to rebut the allegation that his
purpose was to prevent a newcomer from achieving a position in his area.
Another example of a practice often attacked as unlawful is the insistence by
a large concern that customers not deal with its competitors. The Department
of Justice recently sued the Bank of Virginia, alleging that the bank required
that merchants subscribing to its charge-card plan not deal with competing
charge-card plans. The bank, while denying illegality, accepted a consent decree
banning the practice.4 7
In considering preemption of banking opportunities, Bank of Utah, Inc.
v. Commercial Security Bank, Inc.4 8 should be examined. In that case a bank
offered to provide customers with a payroll service plan. Instead of following
normal payroll procedures, the customer was invited to deposit the total amount
of the payroll and provide a journal entry showing how the total was to be
disbursed. Using its accounting machines, the bank would then open accounts
for all employees and send each employee a combination deposit receipt and
payroll record. Other banks in the area objected to the plan, stating that the
bank was rendering free services to the employer in order to obtain the bank
accounts of large blocks of employees.
The district court upheld the plan on the basis that employees were pro-
vided two escape hatches through which they could withdraw their pay from
the defendant bank. 9 There was a provision for automatic transfer to another
bank if the employee wished, and there was also a provision for two free checks
per month to each employee." The court noted that by using one of these checks
an employee could, in effect, write his own paycheck and deposit it in another
bank, even though "large blocks"51 of employees did not take the trouble to
do so.
The court of appeals affirmed,52 holding that the restraints inherent in the
plan were reasonable. Competition was not foreclosed because other banks could
compete to offer similar plans and to obtain accounts of employees. Further-
more, and perhaps of greatest importance, the court found there was no intent
to destroy competition or create a monopoly. If the plan had been used by a
dominant bank as a means of foreclosing competition from smaller banks, serious
issues would have been raised. Of itself, the plan might not have been unlawful,
but it could have been strongly asserted that it was being used as a means to
achieve or preserve a monopoly position.
47 United States v. Bank of Virginia, TRADE REG. REP. (1966 Trade Gas.) ff 71947
(E.D. Va. 1966).
48 Bank of Utah, Inc. v. Commercial Security Bank, Inc., 1965 Trade Gas. 71540 (D.
Utah 1965), aff'd, TRADE REG. REP. (1966 Trade Gas.) 71930 (10th Cir. 1966).
49 Bank of Utah, Inc. v. Commercial Security Bank, Inc., 1965 Trade Cas. 1 71540,
at 81403 (D. Utah 1965).
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 TRADE REG. REP. (1966 Trade Cas.) 71930 (10th Cir. 1966).
53 Id. at 83275.
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C. Refusals To Deal
Refusals to deal also deserve special note. The issues raised by such
refusals pursuant to agreements between banks have already been discussed.54
Refusal to deal as the result of an agreement with another customer will also
raise serious antitrust issues.55
There is, accordingly, a fine but very important line between two situa-
tions. The first is a lawful, unilateral refusal to deal with a loan applicant,
where, for example, his credit is bad or the bank has funds committed to an-
other applicant and deems it to the bank's advantage not to assist a competing
business. The second is a refusal to deal with an applicant by agreement with
another customer and at the latter's request.
It is generally a good idea whenever such a request is received to advise
the customer that the bank has a policy, for its customers' protection as well
as its own, of not acting on any such request and of not even referring it to
the loan officer concerned. Instead, the loan officer should be permitted to
make his decision with complete independence. It may turn out that the
applicant's rating does not measure up to the bank's standards, thereby solving
the problem. Of course, it is otherwise if it turns out that the bank is making
and continues to make loans to other applicants with less favorable credit ratings.
If the applicant were turned down in such circumstances, it would be advisable
for the loan officer to make a memorandum indicating why, acting independently,
he decided to refuse the loan.
IV. Avoiding Antitrust Problems
A. Obtaining Management's Cooperation
The most important part of a compliance project is convincing bank man.
agement that it is important enough to put management's weight behind it.
Usually, when the considerations are fully understood, management will agree.
However, there are a number of attitudes sometimes encountered that reflect
some misunderstanding of the problem.
1. "It's always been done this way."
The attitude summarized in the words, "It's always been done this way,"
is, to a large extent, untrue. For many years banks have been soliciting and
obtaining antitrust advice. In fact, it was over twenty years ago that the Gen-
eral Counsel of the American Bar Association advised that it was safer practice
not to attempt to establish uniform service charges in clearing house agree-
ments. 6 Regardless of what banks have done in the past, however, a progres-
sive management will realize that the success of a bank depends upon its ability
to adapt to changing circumstances. This includes, of course, not" only changing
54 See text accompanying note 34 supra.
55 See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); United States v,
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Klor's, Inc. -v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207 (1959).
56 PATTON, DIGEsT, Clearing Houses § 2 (Supp. 1946).
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commercial patterns and changing technological possibilities, but also changing
legal environments.
2. "They wouldn't dare."
A second attitude sometimes encountered is that suit is not to be expected.
This is summed up in the words, "They wouldn't dare." Frequently this con-
viction is based upon the political judgment of the speaker. Experience has
proved that even the keenest political observers are on shaky ground if they
try to predict, on political grounds, how the antitrust laws will be enforced.
In the first place, there is usually a substantial gap between the time a practice
is undertaken and the time the antitrust laws are applied to it. Sometimes the
gap is several years, and in this interval many changes can take place on the
political scene. Perhaps more important, it is a serious miscalculation to assume
that it is only the Government that enforces the antitrust laws. Much if not
most of the antitrust litigation now in the courts was instituted by private par-
ties,5" and their decision to sue was obviously not controlled by political con-
siderations. Although it may be generally true that there is a certain reluctance
among businessmen to sue banks, and perhaps an even greater reluctance among
banks to sue each other, the record shows that such suits have occurred. The
Bank of Utah case is an example.5"
Often antitrust issues come into a case by the back door. They are pleaded
as a matter of defense or as a matter of counterclaim. Hazeltine Research, Inc.
v. Zenith Radio Corp.5" is an excellent example. Hazeltine sued Zenith for
patent infringement, and Zenith counterclaimed, alleging violations of the anti-
trust laws. Before long the tail was wagging the dog. Judgment was entered
against Hazeltine, the plaintiff, in an amount in excess of $30,000,000. Banks,
of course, are also frequently required to use the courts to enforce their rights
and can expect that antitrust issues will be raised wherever possible by resource-
ful defense attorneys.
3. "They have the burden of proof."
The attitude summed up in the words, "They have the burden of proof,"
is one about which businessmen are frequently badly informed. Many of them
think that "proof" means proof positive, whereas violations of the antitrust laws,
as well as other legal claims, are frequently proved from relatively thin and
equivocal evidence. The courts recognize that illegal action is frequently not
reduced to writing, and they accordingly give considerable weight to frag-
mentary evidence. Therefore, offhand or colorful remarks in memoranda, some-
times even inaccurate remarks, can be taken as indicating monopolistic or con-
spiratorial intentions, often the most crucial fact in an antitrust case. Documents
merely indicating meetings of competitors can be put together with additional
evidence sufficient for a court to infer that subsequent price increases were agreed
upon at the meeting.
57 See Current Case Table, TRADE REo. REP. (1967 Trade Gas.).
58 See notes 48-53 supra and accompanying text.
59 1965 Trade Cas. 71355 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
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From a practical point of view, it is just as important to avoid the appear-
ance of illegality as it is to avoid the illegality itself. The well-advised client
will keep a record or make a report justifying the legality of his conduct rather
than relying upon his adversary's inability to prove his case. After all, what
bank does not keep records to protect itself against even the miniscule claims
of suppliers or depositors? Why should it not keep records to protect itself
against antitrust claims that are certain to involve far more substantial sums?
4. "Let them sue."
The attitude summed up in the words, "Let them sue" is not common
among businessmen with prior experience in antitrust litigation. The expense,
publicity, and disruption of business, even if the defense is successful, is enough
to justify some effort to reduce one's exposure to such suits. Obviously, the
consequences of an unsuccessful defense can be even more serious.
B. Appraising Restrictive Provisions
Once management is convinced of the desirability of a compliance program,
the operation of the program presents few difficulties. There is an initial hurdle
in reviewing outstanding agreements and practices, but after this is done the
operation of the compliance program can be absorbed into a current schedule.
The first task is to review the interbank agreements and the policies of the
bank in dealing with its customers. There are three rules-of-thumb that are
useful in this connection.
The most important is to ask, when a restraint of trade is found, whether
the restraint is truly necessary. Restraints often have been incorporated in
agreements due to an abundance of caution, although they are really unneces-
sary. In fact, when a bank yields on another point to obtain such a restraint
in its contract, it may be paying for something it does not need. In
such situations, the simplest way of dealing with the problem is to remove
or waive the restraint. In quite a number of cases, adopting this approach will
constitute a good business as well as a good antitrust practice.
Where the restraint is necessary, the second rule-of-thumb is to ask whether
the restraint goes further than is required to serve a lawful purpose. For ex-
ample, it is frequently possible to cut down a restraint's scope in time or subject
matter and still preserve the parties' basic objectives. The lawyer's surgery on
overly broad restraints may even result in clarifying the basic objectives of the
parties, thereby producing a more effective agreement.
Finally, as a third rule-of-thumb, one should require more than oral
explanations of the reasonableness of restraints. It is much better to obtain
documentation for the bank's files and refer to or incorporate it into the agree-
ment imposing the restraint. Here the purpose is threefold: first, when the lawyer
obtains the evidence, he can see if it adequately supports his client's position;
second, unless he obtains the evidence, the witnesses and the documentation
may not be available later when needed; third, it is generally unwise to include
an unexplained restraint in an agreement. If the restraint is explained and made
to appear reasonable by references to the evidence justifying it, it is less likely
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that the agreement will seem unreasonably restrictive to an outsider, thereby
reducing the likelihood that it will be attacked as invalid.
C. Keeping up-to-date
No compliance program is any better than the procedure followed for
keeping it up-to-date. Periodic briefing sessions are necessary to orient new
operating personnel. Such sessions are useful also in answering questions and
updating the knowledge of personnel previously briefed and can be worked into
other staff meetings. To supplement these sessions, spot checks, particularly of
files, are useful in ascertaining whether operating personnel have fully under-
stood the material covered. A program for reporting unusually sensitive occur-
rences, such as meetings with competitors or refusals to deal in spite of ac-
ceptable credit, is often of great help in enabling counsel to protect his client's
interest before the plot thickens sufficiently to cause embarrassment to the client
or other parties who may be involved.
V. Conclusion
In summary, the application of the antitrust laws to everyday practices
may be expected to become a subject of great importance to banks. Enough
has been done by the Department of Justice to make the banking community
realize that failure to comply may have criminal, as well as civil, consequences. No
comfort can realistically be taken from the dearth of cases on point. Although
the laws present some uncertainties, other businesses have been able to adjust
to them successfully. A positive program for compliance with these laws may
prove to be a sound and practical investment for bank management.
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